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Abstract
In the heart of the Great Crisis, amidst great uncertainty and concerns surrounding the future of
capitalism, John Maynard Keynes launched his optimistic prophecy that growth and technological
change would allow mankind to solve its economic problem within a century. He envisioned a world
where people would work much less and be less oppressed by the satisfaction of material needs. He
made quantitative statements predicting that “the standard of life in progressive countries one hundred
years hence will be between four and eight times as high...” as in his time. And he wrote about worktime
that “...a fifteen-hour week may put off the problem for a great while.” He also expected the new era to
bring about “great changes in the code of morals”, such that the new society will “honour those who can
teach (us) how to pluck the hour and the day virtuously and well, the delightful people who are capable
of taking direct enjoyment in things....”  To what extent have his predictions turned out to be accurate?
Economic growth indeed resumed during the 1930s, but the conflagration of World War II was soon to
come. Yet, after the end of the war, the engine of growth restarted, and the world thereafter underwent
an unprecedented transformation. And people today indeed spend a smaller fraction of their lives in
work activity. However, there are large differences in both standards of living and attitudes towards
work across countries and individuals. In this essay, I assess Keynes' forecasts from a global
perspective. In the first section, I review and discuss the growth experience of the world in the second
half of the Twentieth Century. Next, I discuss Keynes' predictions about working time and leisure.
Finally, I conclude.
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In the heart of the Great Crisis, amidst great uncertainty and concerns surrounding the
future of capitalism, John Maynard Keynes launched his optimistic prophecy that growth and
technological change would allow mankind to solve its economic problem within a century. He
envisioned a world where people would work much less and be less oppressed by the satisfaction
of material needs. He made quantitative statements predicting that “the standard of life in
progressive countries one hundred years hence will be between four and eight times as high...”
as in his time. And he wrote about worktime that “...a fifteen-hour week may put oﬀ the
problem for a great while.” He also expected the new era to bring about “great changes in
the code of morals”, such that the new society will “honour those who can teach (us) how to
pluck the hour and the day virtuously and well, the delightful people who are capable of taking
direct enjoyment in things....”
To what extent have his predictions turned out to be accurate? Economic growth indeed
resumed during the 1930s, but the conflagration of World War II was soon to come. Yet, after
the end of the war, the engine of growth restarted, and the world thereafter underwent an
unprecedented transformation. And people today indeed spend a smaller fraction of their lives
in work activity. However, there are large diﬀerences in both standards of living and attitudes
towards work across countries and individuals.
In this essay, I assess Keynes’ forecasts from a global perspective. In the first section,
I review and discuss the growth experience of the world in the second half of the Twenti-
eth Century. Next, I discuss Keynes’ predictions about working time and leisure. Finally, I
conclude.
1 A half century of growth: the empirical evidence.
Diverging from Keynes’ focus on “progressive countries”, I consider the long-run growth ex-
perience of the entire global economy. To this aim, I use the version 6.1 of the Penn World
Tables, which provide a panel of annual observations for 168 countries during the period 1950-
2000.1 I focus on Purchasing-Power-Parity adjusted data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
per capita. In spite of well-known limitations, these provide an estimate of the evolution of
the material standards of living over time and across countries
The panel is unbalanced, since the time-series of many countries are incomplete. To reduce
the extent of the problem, I exclude the countries which were formerly part of the Soviet block
1The dataset is available online from
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php)
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from my sample, as data for them are only available for recent years. In addition, I only
include observations after 1952 — the earliest year for which the data from China are available
—, leaving a panel running from 1952 to 2000, and including up to 127 countries representing
between 74% and 85% of the world population.2
I compute the population-weighted average GDP per capita growth for the world and for
a subset of large geographical areas, weighting the annual growth rate of each country by
its population size.3 Keynes’ forecast implies an upper bound growth rate about 2.1%. The
population-weighted average growth rate over the half century in question is 2.9% per year,
implying a 4-fold increase in the standards of living in just fifty years (recall that an increase
by a factor of four was the lower bound of Keynes’ prediction over a hundred-year horizon).
If we project the 2.9% annual growth over one century, it corresponds to a 17-fold increase in
the standards of living, i.e., more than double Keynes’ upper bound. Clearly, the second half
of the Twentieth Century has been an era of unprecedented material progress.4
There is no evidence, at the global level, that the engine of growth is losing steam. Quite
the opposite, Figure 1 shows that (population-weighted) growth has accelerated in the last part
of the century. What accounts for this performance? Figure 2 breaks growth down by large
geographical areas. In the first panel, we compare OECD to non-OECD countries.5 With an
average growth rate over 4% (3.5%, if we exclude Japan), OECD countries grew significantly
faster than non-OECD countries (2.2%) in the period 1950-1970. The situation was thereafter
reversed, and in the period 1970-2000 OECD countries only grew at an annual 2.3% annually,
while non-OECD grew at an annual 3.1% annually in the period 1970-2000. Thus, from a
2Since China accounts for almost one fourth of the world population, not having China in the dataset before
1952, and having it thereafter would aﬀect significantly the estimate of the world average growth rate. In my
estimates, China is always included.
3More precisely, the annual growth rate of the world (or of any subset of it) is the arithmetic average of the
growth rates of all countries in the sample, where each observation is weighted by its population size (e.g., in
year 2000, China has a weight of 0.24, while Switzerland has a weight of 0.0014). The five-year average is then
constructed as an average of the relevant five annual observations.
4By construction, population-weighted average growth rates diﬀer from the growth rate of the average GDP
pc in the world. For example, suppose that the world consists of two countries with identical populations, A
and B. Let A and B have, respectively, a GDP of 100 and 200. Suppose that the GDP doubles in A and remains
constant in B (thus, the world GDP increases from 300 to 400). Then, the population-weighted average growth
rate is 50%, whereas the world average GDP only grows 33%. The latter measure understates, relatively to the
one I use, the performance of low-income countries.
Conceptually, my measure provides an answer the following question: what is the annual growth rate in an
individual’s standards of living, if she or he, behind the veil of ignorance, is dropped in a random country in
1950?
Interestingly, if one focuses on the alternative measure, the growth rate is 2.2%, which matches Keynes’
forecast very closely.
5 I regard Korea and Mexico as non-OECD countries as they only entered the organization in 1994 and 1996,
respectively. The results are shown both with and without the inclusion of Japan, since Japan is a large country
which was relatively poor in 1950 and had an exceptionally strong performance.
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global perspective, the third quarter of the century was an age of divergence between rich and
poor nations, while the last quarter was one of convergence.
Breaking down the economic performance into subareas within the developed and devel-
oping world is also interesting. Consider, first, the rich economies. The growth rate of income
per capita was very high in Europe throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but then it suﬀered a
slowdown (second panel). In contrast, North America (US and Canada) exhibits a less pro-
nounced trend. In the 1990s, GDP per capita grew significantly faster in North America than
in Europe. We will discuss later how changes in labor supply behavior are largely responsible
for this divergence.
The development boom is mainly an Asian phenomenon (third panel). What Gunnar
Myrdal described in the end of the 1960’s as an “Asian drama” has to a large extent turned
into an “Asian miracle”. Strong economic performance was confined to East Asia in the third
quarter of the century. But economic success later spread to the two Asian giants, India and
China, whose exceptional growth in the last quarter of century accounts for a large share of
the high world average. East Asia, in contrast, suﬀered some slowdown in the 1990’s.6
Unfortunately, the rest of the developing world failed to record a comparable progress (last
panel). The performance of Latin America was strong in the third quarter of the century (3.2%
per year), but weakened considerably (1.1%) thereafter amidst repeated crises. The Middle
East (including North Africa) followed a similar trajectory. Sub-Saharan Africa, finally, made
no significant progress towards the solution of the “economic problem.” Its average growth over
half century was low, and the trend even more discouraging: during the 1980’s and 1990’s,
the standards of living fell rather than improving. In 2000, the average GDP per capita of
Sub-Saharan African countries was 1576 USD, slightly exceeding a mere 6% of the average
GDP per capita in OECD economies. It would take a century of steady 3% annual growth for
the average Sub-Saharan African country to attain the standards of living rich countries enjoy
today.
In conclusion, mankind managed to attain, on average, major progress in the second half
of the Twentieth Century, well above Keynes’ optimistic expectations. However, the solution
of the economic problem is still distant for a large share of its citizens. In 2000, the average
GDP per capita among non-OECD countries (which represent more vast majority of the world
population) still falls short of the GDP per capita of the US a century earlier. The tragedy
of Sub-Saharan Africa remains as acute as ever, with AIDS, civil wars and political unrest
6The data of India are presented here jointly with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Although none of these countries performed as strongly as India, the average regional performance is only
marginally aﬀected, as India is by far the largest country.
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making miserable living conditions for the majority of its 600 million inhabitants. There are
further unpleasant developments: within-country inequality has increased all over the world,
making the increase of extreme poverty in the low-performing regions even more dramatic.7
Why do standards of living persistently remain so diverse? Part of the diﬀerence is due
to capital accumulation. But, as a number of recent studies document, an even larger part is
due technological diﬀerences (or diﬀerences in “total factor productivity”). Poor countries
fail to adopt the more productive technologies that firms use in the industrialized world,
or only do so with a significant delay. Explaining why the diﬀusion of ideas and technical
improvements across the planet remains so slow is the subject of a long-standing debate.
Institutional and political failures generating barriers to technology adoption are certainly an
important factor.8 In Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we argue that, even if such barriers
were absent, the process of innovation originating in the industrialized world may produce
technologies which are “inappropriate” for the needs of the developing world, because of the
complementarity of new technologies with human skills. Innovation in developed countries tend
to develop new technologies which require skilled workers to be operated (see the IT revolution
in the 1990s, for instance). The scarcity of highly educated workers limits the ability of
poor economies to benefit from these technologies, inhibiting technological convergence.9 The
concurrent presence of growth-promoting institutions and high educational investment indeed
seems to be the key of the success in South and East Asian economies.
2 More income or more leisure?
Keynes forecasted that a consequence of the material progress would be a reduction in the
time people devote to working activities. He expected that, since consumption needs would be
subject to some satiation, every person would only need to work about fifteen hours a week.
A strong trend towards the reduction of the worktime already existed before Keynes’ time
(see Marimon and Zilibotti, 2000). According to the estimates reported by Huberman and
Minns (2005), the average annual number of hours worked per worker fell by almost 30%
between 1870 and 1930, in both Europe and the US. The sharpest drop actually occurred
in the three first decades of the Twentieth Century, so the trend must have made a strong
7For instance, Sala-i-Marti (2002) estimates that the number of people living with less than one USD per
day in Africa has increased by 175 million between 1970 and 1998.
8See, e.g., Parente and Prescott (2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2006).
9 In Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we calibrate a growth model with endogenous technical change where the
extent to which new technologies enhance the productivity of skilled and unskilled workers is also endogenous.
The model can account for a large share of the empirical variation in cross-country total factor productivity
diﬀerences.
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impression on Keynes’ contemporaries. After World War II, on the one hand, the number of
hours per worker indeed fell further, but at a lower rate, and to a stronger degree in Europe
than in the US. On the other hand, the female labor participation increased significantly,
partially oﬀsetting the decline in the number of hours worked by male workers. To date, the
working week has not fallen to fifteen hours anywhere in the world, nor can we reasonably
expect this to occur by the year 2030. A number of factors should, however, be taken into
consideration in order to assess how much leisure people enjoy today.
First, worktime as a share of an individual’s life has indeed fallen significantly. In 2000, life
expectancy in Great Britain was about twenty years longer than it was in 1930 (seventeen in
the US). Although part of this diﬀerence is due to lower infant mortality, the survival rates of
adults are also significantly higher. For instance, the life expectancy of US white males at age
twenty has increased by approximately ten years, and the increase is even larger for females
and other ethnic groups. Likewise, the life expectancy of white males aged sixty also rose from
fifteen to twenty years in the same period. In contrast, retirement age has fallen: the median
retirement age for men in the US has fallen, again in the same period, from age seventy to age
sixty-two (see Eisensee, 2006). This means that the fraction of an individual’s lifetime spent
on working activities is much smaller today than in 1930.
Consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation. I construct a fictitious “Keynes’
forecast” supposing that Keynes did not anticipate the changes in life expectancy, female
participation rate and retirement age. In this scenario, an agent enters the labor force at
fifteen, then works fifteen hours per week with probability 60% up to age sixty-five, then
works fifteen hours with probability 30% up to age seventy, and then dies. Here, age seventy
matches the life expectancy of a twenty-year old in 1930, while 60% and 30% are the share of
employed people in the respective age group (see footnote below for more details).10 I contrast
“Keynes’ forecast” with a “2000 real world” scenario, where an agent enters the labor force
when fifteen, then works (in two alternative experiments matching, broadly the European and
10 In 2000, the employment rate (i.e., the proportion of employed in the population 15-64) was about 70%
in the Anglo-Saxon world (65% in the average OECD). As stated in the text, I construct the pseudo-"Keynes
forecast" by ignoring the increase in the female participation rate and other changes in labor supply behavior.
In 1930, the female participation rates in the US and UK were, respectively, 26% and 35%, while they amounted
to 60% and 53%, respectively, in 2000 (see Costa, 2000). Since changes in the length of education and early
retirement went in the opposite direction, I assume that Keynes underestimated the actual employment rate by
10% points (60% in "Keynes forecast" vs. 70% in the "2000 real world").
In addition, many elderly were working before the establishment of modern pension systems (for instance,
about 40% of males above 65 were working in major OECD countries in 1950). For this reason, I assume in
"Keynes forecast" that 30% of the population over sixty-five is at work. In contrast, no retiree is assumed to
work in the "2000 real world".
I should also stress that my simple calculation assumes, for simplicity, a constant population age structure.
See Ramey and Francis (2006) for a thorough discussion.
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US experience) either thirty or thirty-eight hours per week with probability 70% up to age
sixty-five, then lives as a retiree up to age eighty, and then dies.11 In both cases, I assume
agents to have at their disposal sixteen hours a day (with eight hours being devoted to sleeping),
and I ignore the lifetime between birth and age fifteen.
The results are as follows. In “Keynes’ forecast”, the average individual works 7.6% of
her/his lifetime endowment. In contrast, in the “2000 real world”, she/he works 14.4% of
her/his lifetime in the thirty hours workweek case, and 18.3% in the thirty-eight hours work-
week case.
Second, Keynes expected aﬄuence to free time for leisure. If we want to know how much
time people can devote to enjoyment, we must subtract to the time available to humans not
only the number of hours they work in the market, but also the time they spend in house-related
work activity. I should stress up front that there is no consensus in the literature about the
secular trend in housework. According to the estimates reported by Greenwood et al. (2005),
housework per household in the US amounted to an average forty hours in 1930. A recent
study by Achen and Staﬀord (2005) based on the Panel of Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
concludes that in 2001 this amounted (for married couples in the US) to 25 hours per week.
Assuming that the data are comparable, more than one hour per person per day was freed
from the yoke of housework. Such change has been made possible by labor-savings technical
improvements in basic facilities and electrical appliances (running water, refrigerator, washer,
vacuum, etc.). Not all the time saved at home has been devoted to leisure, though, and the
study of Greenwood et al. (2005) attributes an increase of about 28% points in the female
labor supply between 1900 and 1980 to the technological revolution in the household sector.12
Third, people spend today a larger share of their lifetime on education activities. Ramey
and Francis (2006) report that the annual per capita hours in a cross-section of the US pop-
ulation spent on school went up from six hundred to nine hundred in the period 1970-2000.
How should we regard this educational activity? I suspect that Keynes would count it as part
of the benefits of mankind’s liberation from the necessity of material production. But if one
takes the pessimistic view that educational eﬀort is as painful as working in a mine, one may
want to account the increase in education as an oﬀsetting factor in the secular reduction of
11European employed workers (including both full-time and part-time) worked in 2000 an average 30-33 hours
per week, and enjoy ca. thirty—five days of holidays and vacation. In the US, the corresponding figure is 38
hours, and with ca. twenty days of holidays and vacation.
12Ramey and Francis (2006) criticize the data of Greenwood et al. (2005). According to their evidence,
housework per capita, somewhat surprisingly, did not fall, and even increased in the US in the period 1900-
2000. Their study reports that housewives did over fifty hours housework per week around 1930s (see p. 16 and
Figure 8). This is double the housework done by American couples in the PSID in 2001 according to the study
of Achen and Staﬀord (2005).
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worktime.
In summary, people work for a smaller fraction of their lives today than in 1930. I also
believe that people enjoy more leisure, although I acknowledge that there is less consensus on
this point. Equally important, technical progress has had important eﬀects on the quality of
worktime and leisure opportunities. Working conditions are better and more salubrious. And if,
to put it like Keynes, “three hours a day is quite enough to satisfy the old Adam in most of us”,
entering the labor market had some positive implications for Eve. Labor participation and the
possibility of developing a career have been vehicles of female emancipation. Finally, technical
progress has increased the variety of leisure goods and reduced the time which is necessary for
performing many leisure activities (e.g., progress in transportation facilities makes it possible
to travel more extensively and in a shorter time).
I would like also to comment on the evolution of labor supply over the last thirty years.
European and Americans seem to have developed diﬀerent tastes about how to enjoy technical
progress. Europeans have decided — perhaps following Keynes’ inclination — to enjoy more
leisure, while Americans work longer hours. More precisely, back in the mid-1970’s Britons,
Germans and Frenchmen worked on average 5-10% more than Americans. At the turn of
the century, however, they only work 70-75% of their American counterparts (see, Prescott,
2004, Table 1).13 As a matter of fact, while the GDP per capita has grown faster in the US
than in Europe, the opposite is true when one looks at output per hour worked. GDP per
hour has increased by 38% In the US between 1970 and 2000, while GDP per hour in France
rose by 83% in the same period.14 Germany and other continental European countries also
behaved much like France. This is almost entirely due to the contrasting labor supply behavior.
What can explain this diﬀerence? According to Prescott (2004), the key is cross-country
diﬀerences in the distortionary eﬀects of labor income tax. Blanchard (2004) oﬀers a less
pessimistic view: Europeans may be choosing a more balanced allocation of the productivity
gains between increasing income and leisure. Whether as a matter of taste or as the eﬀect
of policies (that are in any case the outcome of democratic processes), Europeans seem to be
moving in the direction Keynes suggested. Whether further movements in this direction are
feasible is unclear, however, especially since the demographic trend is increasing over time the
proportion of retirees in the population, and worktime reductions in the active population may
jeopardize the sustainability of the pension system.
13The data in the text, borrowed from Prescott’s study, detail hours worked per person aged 15-64. Thus,
they include people who are unemployed or out of the labor force. If instead we look at weekly hours per
worker in 2000, they were thirty-eight in the US, thirty-three in the UK, and between thirty and thirty-two in
Continental Europe.
14Here, the example and figures are from Blanchard (2004)
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Why do we work more hours than forecasted by Keynes? I must start by saying that
economic theory oﬀers no compelling reason for technical progress to make people work less.
Textbook economics teach us that as productivity grows, income and substitution eﬀect work
in opposite directions: as we get richer, we demand more leisure (income eﬀect), but its
opportunity cost also increases (substitution eﬀect). With standard preferences, the net eﬀect
can go either way.
However, Keynes proposed a more sophisticated argument that goes beyond the simple
trade-oﬀ between labor and leisure. He argues that some evolutionary process (or learning)
aﬀects the intensity with which people are capable of enjoying leisure or tolerating labor ef-
fort. The ability to appreciate leisure would depend on some acquired taste and, possibly,
on complementary investments increasing the ability to appreciate specific leisure activities.
For instance, it takes time, eﬀort and devotion to become capable to appreciate literature or
classical music. According to Keynes, the secular slavery of economic necessity selected human
preferences involving a high tolerance of labor eﬀort and some limited ability to appreciate
good life. Keynes anticipated that the progressive satiation of material needs would natu-
rally generate a shift of preferences, whereby people would become better at appreciating arts
and beauty. Moral values would also change, and the obsession for money-making would be
replaced by a new humanism.
Interestingly, the recent economic literature on “endogenous preferences” echoes this view.
For instance, we use a similar — if somewhat opposite — argument in Doepke and Zilibotti (2005
and 2006) to explain the decline of the aristocratic elite at the outset of the British industrial
revolution. We argue that the pre-industrial elite, accustomed as it was to rearing its children
in the devotion to arts, pleasures and a variety of leisure-oriented activities (from classical
music to fox hunting), developed a sense of disdain for hard work and a low propensity to save
and invest. The urban middle-class, in contrast, was reared in the values of thriftiness and
perseverance which were most important in the life experience of artisans and traders. For this
reason, the latter developed a “capitalist spirit” that, as emphasized in the celebrated work
of Max Weber, became a major advantage once new opportunities arose with the Industrial
Revolution. This can explain the triumph of the bourgeoisie and the demise of the aristocracy
during the Industrial Revolution.
Keynes’ argument goes one step further in time. He argues that when economic needs are
satiated, a reversal will occur, and the appreciation of arts and leisure will again become the
evolutionary successful trait. Can we see evidence of the change predicted by Keynes? Hardly,
in my view. The growing phenomenon of obesity is an emblematic sign of the quantitative
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(as opposed to qualitative) nature of people’s consumption habits. Another is the growing
pressure for downsizing the provision of public goods such as health services, green areas,
or elderly care that aﬀect people’s daily quality of life. The return to these savings is yet
more private consumption, in a society where private opulence risks being coupled with public
poverty. Markets seem to have been proven capable of supplying an amazing quantity and
variety of leisure goods that require more money than time to be enjoyed. These goods are
strong competitors for traditional cultural consumption goods requiring lengthy training and
education towards their appreciation. But the last word may have not been said, and we may
just be learning to appreciate of good life too slowly.
3 Conclusion
Did Keynes’ optimism prove warranted? His expectations about improvements in the mate-
rial conditions of mankind were correct. Indeed, material progress has led to extraordinary
expansion of the opportunities which we can today enjoy. Keynes’ forecasts about the cul-
tural implications of growth are more problematic, and material needs do not show any clear
tendency of becoming satiated.
Material progress continues, however, to be the primary problem for large parts of the world,
especially for the 600 million people who continue to live in conditions of extreme poverty.
Hopefully, growth will continue to be contagious in the developing world. Furthermore, I
do not expect that productivity growth and technical change will slowdown in industrialized
economies, although future generations may decide to enjoy the fruit of the technical progress
in diﬀerent ways, including shorter worktime.
However, growth is not just about good news. I see the environmental sustainability as a
major unresolved question. I cannot subscribe to the optimism of many economists in this re-
spect. There are neither eﬀective self-correcting nor, to date, institutional mechanisms that can
prevent a “tragedy of the commons” on a global scale. We can hope that technical progress
will take a stronger move in the natural resource-saving direction. But this will not come
through the invisible hand. It will instead hinge on a strong political will to constrain and
make more expensive the use and abuse of natural resources as well as the emission of pollu-
tants. However, the action of special interest groups in some rich countries is blocking these
necessary interventions on the one hand; on the other hand, environmental issues remain a
luxury good for countries striving to solve their “economic problem.” If these countries decide
to use natural resources as intensively as the first industrializers, the environmental eﬀects
might be dramatic. The only hope for success involves rich countries inducing poorer coun-
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tries, through their financial and technical support and via incentive-compatible mechanisms,
to adopt environmentally-friendly technologies. The set of current international institutions is
far too underdeveloped to tackle this issue. The risk of a global failure is, in my view, severe.
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